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WHAT IT TAKES TO BE GREAT: 
ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS ON MAGNANIMITY 
David A. Horner 
The revival of virtue ethics is largely inspired by Aristotle, but few-especially 
Christians-follow him in seeing virtue supremely exemplified in the "mag-
nanimous" man. However, Aristotle raises a matter of importance: the charac-
ter traits and type of psychological stance exemplified in those who aspire to 
acts of extraordinary excellence. r explore the accounts of magnanimity found in 
both Aristotle and Aquinas, defending the intelligibility and acceptability of 
some central elements of a broadly Aristotelian conception of magnanimity. 
Aquinas, r argue, provides insight into how Christian ethics may appropriate 
central elements of a broadly Aristotelian conception of extraordinary virtue. 
The magnanimolls (or "proud") man has not proved to be the most 
durably popular of Aristotle's ethical portrats. It goes without saying 
that he is directly opposed to Christian humility. But modern dislike of 
him extends far beyond the ranks of believing Christians. He offends that 
spirit of equality-partly rooted, of course, in Christianity-which few of 
us can escape eve II if we try. - John Caset 
The revival of virtue ethics in our time is largely inspired by Aristotle. 
Ironically, those who follow Aristotle's ethical picture closely in other 
matters typically ignore if not flatly denounce his paragon of virtue: the 
great-souled or magnanimous2 man. To those whose ethical perspec-
tives are shaped by the Christian values of human equality, humility, 
and gratitude Aristotle's paradigmatic character often seems closer to 
the nadir than the pinnacle of virtue. Even apart from Christian ideals, 
some argue, the magnanimous man seems hard to square with the rest 
of Aristotle's own, pagan virtue ethic. 
I submit that a rejection of Aristotelian magnanimity in toto, 
although understandable, is too hasty. Even Christians or those commit-
ted to traditionally Christian ideals should take another look at a broad-
ly Aristotelian conception of extraordinary excellence. This for two rea-
sons. First, for the sake of clarifying Aristotle's ethical views generally. 
As noted, Aristotle's ethics have proved quite fruitful for recent theoriz-
ing about virtue. At best, however, a gap is created in our understand-
ing of Aristotle's thought when we ignore his account of magnanimity; 
at worst, especially given magnanimity's prominence, we are left with a 
misunderstanding or distortion of Aristotle's ethics generally. Still, 
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Aristotle's account of magnanimity poses problems of content, coher-
ence, and compatibility with the rest of his virtue ethics. I argue here 
that he has explicit and implicit resources to address some of these prob-
lems, but questions remain. Aristotle's thirteenth century Christian 
interpreter, Thomas Aquinas-notable (some would say, notorious) for 
the extent to which he preserves Aristotle's picture of magnanimity-
adds not only a Christian cast to the discussion, but also illuminates fur-
ther Aristotelian resources for resolving difficulties in Aristotle's view. 
Second, the notion of extraordinary excellence is worth pursuing in its 
own right, for the sake of developing an adequate account of virtue, 
moral psychology, and practical reasoning as they are exemplified not 
only in "average" cases but also in the thought and action of those who 
aspire to extraordinary challenges. Aristotle addressed this notion in 
terms of "magnanimity"; I suggest that he contributes some important 
insights, albeit not always clear, complete, or ethically admirable from 
our perspective. Aquinas's account, again, provides additional resources 
for understanding how broadly Aristotelian insights into extraordinary 
excellence may be compatible with Christian values and virtues. 
I do not attempt here to transform Aristotle's magnanimous man 
into a Christian saint, nor do I seek to defend or even try to make intelli-
gible every element of Aristotle's-or Aquinas's-picture. My aim here 
is to examine both of their accounts of magnanimity in some detail, to 
seek to make intelligible and defensible some of the central elements of a 
broadly Aristotelian conception of extraordinary excellence, and thereby 
to shed light upon Aristotle's and Aquinas's virtue ethics more generally 
and contribute to the project of constructing a broadly Aristotelian 
virtue conception of ethics today.3 
I 
First, a partial sketch of Aristotle's picture of magnanimity in the 
Ethica Nicomachea (EN).4 His account of magnanimity immediately fol-
lows that of another grand virtue, magnificence, which is the disposition 
of giving on a large scale (generosity is the virtue of small-scale giving). 
Similarly magnanimity, concerned with honor on a large scale, is related 
to an unnamed virtue by which one exemplifies the right concern with 
honor on a small scale. 
The subject matter of magnanimity, as initially mooted by Aristotle, 
appealing to its name, is "great things" (megala). The magnanimous 
mans is rightly concerned with great things.6 What are "great things"? 
And just how is the magnanimous person related to them? Aristotle 
specifies the relation between the magnanimous man and great things as 
one of worthiness: the "magnanimous person, then, seems to be the one 
who thinks himself worthy of great things and is really worthy of 
them."? Here Aristotle identifies two necessary conditions for S's being 
magnanimous: 
(i) S thinks himself worthy of great things (Self-estimation condition). 
(ii) S is worthy of great things (Greatness condition). 
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Failures to be magnanimous are identified as failures to satisfy one or 
both of these conditions: 
(i) (Self-estimation) 
(ii) (Greatness) 
Magnanimous 
y 
y 
Pusillanimous 
N 
Y 
(Fig.) 
Temperate 
N 
N 
Vain 
y 
N 
One whose view of his own (low) worth is greater than it actually merits 
is vain;" one of great worth who thinks he is worthy of less than he is is 
pusillanimous (small-souled, mikropsuchos). The greater vice of the two, 
according to Aristotle, is pusillanimity: it is worse and it arises more 
often. One who accurately estimates his low worth is not magnanimous 
but temperate. Aristotle notes, analogously, that a small person may be 
attractive and well-proportioned (the analogue of lowly but temperate), 
but not actually beautiful (the analogue of great); for beauty requires a 
large body, as magnanimity requires actual greatness.9 
We have an early clue in Aristotle's initial characterization of the 
pusillanimous pers(;n that (i) is the chief condition of magnanimity. 
Aristotle says of the pusillanimous person that he wrongly thinks he is 
worthy of less than he is, regardless of what he is actually worth: "and 
even if he is worthy of little, he thinks he is worthy of still less than 
that."l0 One's stance towards one's worth, whatever it is, is most cruciaL 
What is involved in satisfying (i)? Clearly it involves accurate self-
knowledge, knowledge of one's own worthiness. If mere intellectual 
grasp were all that were involved, however, magnanimity would not be 
a moral, but an intellectual virtue. ll But for Aristotle it is a moral virtue; 
as we shall see, it is the crown of the moral virtues, which characterizes 
the best persons. As I shall argue further in section II, it is pivotal to 
Aristotle's conception of magnanimity that right concern with one's own 
worth involves not only accurately grasping it, but also sufficiently 
esteeming and valuing it, desiring to fulfill its complete potential. We 
shall see what is involved in satisfying (ii) as we progress. 
Aristotle also specifies his notion of "great things." They are related 
specifically to external goods, and especially to honor. "Worth is said to 
[make one worthy ofl external goods," and the greatest of these is 
thought to be honor. So the magnanimous man has "one concern above 
all," which is honor. At the same time, paradoxically, he is said to count 
honors for little, even despising goods of fortune. 12 In any case, "the 
magnanimous person has the right concern with honor and dishonor." l' 
Aristotle's initial emphasis in his account of magnanimity is thus 
upon honor, which is evidently understood to be a kind of external 
good, i.e. the reception of acclaim and wealth. A further, more internal 
emphasis arises in Aristotle's account as well, however: that of virtue or 
excellence. The honor in view must be of the right sort: 
The magnanimous person, then, is concerned especially with hon-
ors and dishonors. And when he receives great honors from excel-
lent people, he will be moderately pleased, thinking he is getting 
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what is proper to him, or even less. For there can be no honor wor-
thy of complete virtue; but still he will accept [excellent people's] 
honors, since they have nothing greater to award him. ,. 
The honor in view, then, is that for which the virtue of the magnanimous 
man makes him worthy. Honor is the prize of virtue; only the good person 
is worthy of honors.15 The magnanimous person is the greatest in each 
virtue; magnanimity is a sort of crowning ornament (kosmos tis) to the 
virtues, "for it makes them greater, and it does not arise without them." It 
is impossible to be magnanimous without being fine or noble and good. '6 
Finally, Aristotle's magnanimous man (in contrast to the pseudomag-
nanimous person) is distinguished by his attitudes and actions, including 
the ability to handle properly the great honors and external goods that 
come his way. Virtue is needed to ''bear the results of good fortune suit-
ably."!7 His distinctive attitudes toward others express his fineness: he is 
open in speech and action, unconcerned with praising or being praised, but 
laconic and ironic (eir6neia) toward those of lesser excellence, not seeking to 
display his superiority to them.!S Those with merely a semblance of magna-
nimity, on the other hand, become arrogant and wantonly aggressive, seek-
ing to imitate the distinctive actions and attitudes of the magnanimous man, 
but doing what they please rather than what is fine. The magnanimous per-
son is discriminating: he deems himself worthy of only great honors, and 
will disdain as beneath his worth being honored by just anyone or for 
something small. Unlike those who imitate him in despising or showing 
contempt for others, however, the magnanimous person justifiably despises 
other people, because his beliefs (about his worth and theirs) are true.!9 The 
magnanimous man is eager to be superior in doing good: he does good but 
is ashamed to receive it. He wishes others always to be in his debt, and not 
he in theirs, because being a recipient is inferior and he wishes to be superi-
or. He seems to remember only the good he does, not what he receives; and 
he likewise finds pleasure only in hearing of the good he has done.20 
II 
There are admirable traits among those here depicted, but as 17 whole the 
picture is an unpleasant one . .. The passage simply betrays somewhat 
nakedly the self-absorption which is the bad side of Aristotle's ethics. 
- W.D. Ross2! 
He is very nearly an English gentleman. - Alasdair MacIntyre22 
A number of objections have been raised against Aristotle's account. 
I shall consider several important problems here/3 and attempt to 
answer them from within Aristotle's own, albeit in some cases, implicit 
resources. First, Aristotle's picture of magnanimity appears to suffer 
from problems of coherence, containing internal tensions and standing in 
tension with other elements of his virtue-ethical schema. 
1. The relationship of magnanimity to external goods (including honor) is 
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problematic. The magnanimous person is said on the one hand to be con-
cerned primarily with honor-indeed, according to one critic, obsessed 
with honor.'" On the other hand he is said to count honor for little, to have 
a moderate attitude toward the goods of fortune, even to despise them. 
Are honors, then, to be sought or despised? Further, while initially 
Aristotle's magnanimous man seems to be characterized chiefly by his 
great claims to honor, as the portrait progresses superlative virtue rather 
than honor appears to take center stage. Is the magnanimous person's 
concern honor or is it virtue?25 Does Aristotle actually tie one's moral sta-
tus to one's reception of honors? Several interpreters have argued that 
these tensions in Aristotle's account are the result of his attempt to com-
bine two very different "common beliefs" or endoxa, two competing, pop-
ular conceptions of magnanimity of his time: that of the Homeric hero 
who values greatness, grandeur, and honor; and that of the Socratic, 
moral hero who is indifferent to goods of fortune (including honor), and 
who values virtue supremely.2b Aristotle's attempt is unsuccessful, on this 
view, because these are incompatible conceptions of ideal virtue. 
Aristotle can go some distance towards resolving these tensions. 
First, the two tensions I have mentioned are linked. Aristotle is specific 
as to whether the magnanimous person seeks (or despises) honor, on the 
basis of its relation to virtue. In the EE Aristotle addresses the apparent 
inconsistency between one's being concerned above all with honor and 
yet disdaining the multitude and reputation. He makes a distinction: 
honor may be distinguished by who gives it-whether a crowd of ordi-
nary men or those worthy of consideration; and by the ground upon 
which it is given-whether or not it is truly great. 27 Honor is to be 
despised when given by less than good people, or for less than excellent 
things, but sought from good people, for great things.28 That is, whether 
or not honor is to be sought depends upon its relation to virtue-as 
exemplified by the giver and the recipient. 
Second, relatedly, Aristotle appears to speak of honor in more than 
one way, or homonymously.29 The magnanimous person's being con-
cerned for "honor" may signify 
(RH) Concern for "being honored" (i.e. receiving honor), or 
(DH) Concern for "being honorable" (i.e. being worthy of or 
deserving honor, exemplifying virtue). 
The objection that Aristotle's account reflects an unresolved tension 
between seeking honor and exemplifying virtue depends upon what 
seems to me to be an uncharitable-and unwarranted-reading of 
"honor" as univocally or exclusively signifying (RH). Aristotle certainly 
does construe "honor" in terms of (RH). Still, there is good reason to 
think that he also understands it in terms of (DH), and moreover consid-
ers the latter to be of primary, although less explicit importance. 
Throughout his account Aristotle distinguishes, both implicitly and 
explicitly, between receiving honor and being worthy of honor-not dis-
counting the former, but emphasizing the latter as the primary concern 
of magnanimity. For example: 
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(a) Both the magnanimous and the well-born and rich are honored, 
but only the good person is honorable (timeteos).30 
(b) The counterfeit magnanimous and the truly magnanimous are 
distinguished by how they handle the results of good fortune 
(which, in the context, includes receiving honor): only with 
virtue can one bear them suitably (i.e. honorably; emmeI6s).'1 
(c) Honor has objective value as the proper reward of virtue, and 
the magnanimous person accepts it only when it is deserved, 
and from excellent people.32 
In each of these instances, explicit in (a) and implicit in (b) and (c), a dis-
tinction between (RH) and (DH) is presupposed, and honor construed as 
(DH) is primarily to be valued. Indeed Aristotle's contrast in (a) is unin-
telligible if he understands "honor" only in terms of "being honored." 
Aristotle's use of "honor," then, reflects the homonymy we have 
noted, and we need not attribute to him a confusion or incoherence.3' 
Moreover, by recognizing the homonymy we are able to understand this 
account as exemplifying Aristotle's characteristic strategy of affirming 
central elements of each of the competing endoxa, but on his own terms. 
In this case he is able to affirm the common belief that honor is the central 
concern of magnanimity. With the Socratic ideal he maintains that the 
magnanimous person's primary concern is to act honorably, to be worthy 
of honor; with the Homeric ideal he grants the objective value of honors 
received, yet only insofar as they rightly reward greatness in the virtues. 
The magnanimous person's moral status need be tied only to the latter, 
not the former. It is important to note, however, that, unlike later, e.g. 
Stoic views, Aristotle does not exclude received goods of fortune from 
ethical view. External goods and honors contribute to magnanimity.3' 
Magnanimity is needed not only in order to be worthy of honor, but also 
to handle well honors that may be (and often are) received. Both honors 
deserved and honors received are in view and stressed.'s 
2. There appear to be tensions between Aristotle's account of magna-
nimity and other features of his virtue-ethical schema. First, Aristotelian 
virtues concern passions and actions/6 yet the subject matter of magna-
nimity is honors, which is neither. Moreover in this case the right exer-
cise of the virtue is tied necessarily to an object external to the agent. 
How may this be accounted for in an Aristotelian virtue conception? 
Aristotle provides little insight into how external objects may be 
related to action and passion within his virtue picture, especially in the 
case of magnanimity.37 However, honor for Aristotle is related in great 
part to action. We have already seen that honor and virtue are closely 
related; honor and excellent action are also closely related, which should 
not be surprising in light of Aristotle's general metaphysical teleology 
according to which a virtue is perfected in action. Although Aristotle 
does not make it explicit in his account of magnanimity proper, he does 
indicate, I suggest, that the magnanimous person's concern for great 
things is broader than a concern to obtain his glorious deserts, but also 
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includes a concern to aim at extraordinarily excellent action. This con-
cern becomes more explicit in Aristotle's portrayal of the vices related to 
magnanimity. According to Aristotle the goods of which the pusillani-
mous person deprives himself (Le. "great things") because he does not 
esteem himself worthy of them, include not only external goods 
(Aristotle's stress thus far), but also "fine actions and practices." If the 
pusillanimous person knew his worth he would aim at these things 
rather than hold back, because "each person seeks what [he thinks] he is 
worth."38 The vain, on the other hand, attempt exploits and pretend to 
honors of which they are not worthy, and clothe themselves with the 
trappings of honor unworthily.39 Thus the great things about which the 
magnanimous person is concerned include both deeds and desert,,-excel-
lent actions and exploits as well as the proper rewards of those actions:o 
The picture emerges, then, that the actual greatness of personal 
worth, (ii), which the magnanimous person correctly perceives himself 
to possess, (i), comprises both (a) what is needed to accomplish acts of 
extraordinary excellence: those abilities, strengths, dispositions, and 
opportunities which would enable him to accomplish great exploits and 
fine actions, such as great heroism on the battlefield," which are rightly 
rewarded by the "trappings" of great honors; and (b) the disposition to 
handle such honors well when they are forthcoming. The magnanimous 
person, then, is one who recognizes accurately and esteems sufficiently his 
ability to accomplish extraordinary actions of virtue, and handles well his suc-
cess in accomplishing them. On this picture, the rival Homeric and 
Socratic conceptions of magnanimity are in fact quite close: a stress on 
excellent acts (as opposed to merely deserts) on the part of the Homeric 
magnanimous person renders him very like the Socratic magnanimous 
person who excels in virtue, since on Aristotle's theory virtue is exempli-
fied essentially in excellent action. 
Another tension, between Aristotle's account of magnanimity and his 
general picture of virtue as a mean, is exemplified in an apparent conflict 
between the two necessary conditions for magnanimity (the self-estima-
tion (i) and greatness (ii) conditions). While (i) may plausibly be con-
strued as a mean, viz. a mean state of discernment or perception, (ii)-by 
its built-in extreme condition-does not obviously fit Aristotle's frame-
work of virtues as means or intermediate states. Indeed Aristotle admits: 
"The magnanimous person, then, is at the extreme in so far as he makes 
great claims. But in so far as he makes them rightly, he is intermediate; 
for what he thinks he is worthy of reflects his real worth."42 It would seem 
to be more consistent with Aristotle's general virtue picture to restrict the 
subject matter of honor in general to the operation of a single virtue, 
where the virtuous mean constitutes a reasonable response to all honors, 
whether great or small, and leave greatness out of the picture entirely.43 
Aristotle is not of much explicit help here, but he has some room for 
response. First, negatively, an overly simple construal of Aristotle's doc-
trine of the mean as an intermediate condition sits uncomfortably with 
others of his virtues as well.44 Aristotle's conception of the straightfor-
ward passionate virtue of courage, for example, involves a relationship 
between two passions rather than being simply an intermediate condi-
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tion in the expression of one." Justice, like magnanimity, but unlike the 
other moral virtues, is tied to external states of affairs rather than to 
means of action or passion relative to the agent. 46 Second, magnanimity 
is not the only virtue that builds in an external greatness condition: so 
also does the other grand virtue, magnificence. Indeed, it is this very 
respect that, for Aristotle, primarily distinguishes these extraordinary 
virtues from the ordinary. The important question, then, is how actual 
greatness could be required for the exemplification of an Aristotelian 
moral virtue. Aristotle provides no further insight. 
On the one hand, it does seem correct to say that the person of extra-
ordinary virtue-by virtue of being extraordinary, as it were-must pos-
sess greater capabilities and opportunities for greater deeds. On the other 
hand, if this is granted, the relationship between the grand, extraordinary 
virtues and the rest of the moral virtues comes into question. For exam-
ple, according to Aristotle's doctrine of the unity or connection of the 
virtues, one must exemplify all of the virtues in order to exemplify any of 
them. But if magnanimity is a moral virtue on a par of order with the oth-
ers, and if only a supreme few individuals are magnanimous, then it fol-
lows that only the supreme few exemplify any of the virtues. To fail to be 
magnanimous would be to fail to be virtuous. However, Aristotle clearly 
treats magnanimity differently from other virtues in this respect. 47 It is 
possible to fail to be magnanimous and yet to be virtuous-for the one 
who assesses his lower worth correctly exemplifies the core virtue of tem-
perance, and thus the rest of the moral virtues." How then do we charac-
terize the difference between magnanimity and other virtues? 
One important difference between magnanimity and the other virtues 
is that magnanimity appears to be a second-order, meta-virtue which is 
related to the other, first-order virtues as, in Aristotle's terms, a kind of 
adornment which applies when each of the other virtues is greatly exem-
plified.'" Along this line, the relationship between magnanimity (as extra-
ordinary virtue) and ordinary virtue has been compared to that between 
supererogation and obligation." Thus, Sherman suggests, failure to exempli-
fy magnanimity may not be like (blameworthily) failing to exemplify 
courage, but instead like exemplifying courage yet failing to do so with 
charm or grace (thus being less than great but not being vicious or blame-
worthy). Magnanimity on this view is a style of virtue that supervenes 
upon its complete action- or passion-complement.sl If this is correct, 
Aristotle could hold to the unity of the virtues at the ordinary level, while 
reserving a further level of extraordinary virtue for an ethical elite. 
Is this Aristotle's picture of magnanimity? It seems so, in part. 
Aristotle identifies magnanimity as a crowning virtue, which makes the 
other virtues greater. Moreover, the distinction between ordinary and 
extraordinary virtue seems consistent with Aristotle's assignment of 
blame regarding failures of magnanimity. In the case of the temperate 
person, who fulfills condition (i) of magnanimity, but not (ii), his low 
self-estimation is accurate, commensurate with his low worth. According 
to Aristotle he is "not to be blamed," unlike one who fails to exemplify 
one of the other moral virtues. Indeed, rather, he is similar to the mag-
nanimous: he has the potential for magnanimity, for should his personal 
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worth increase, his accurate self-esteem would increase commensurately 
and he would aim at the things of which he is worthy. 52 Since he is virtu-
ous without being magnanimous, magnanimity cannot be necessary to 
virtue. Thus magnanimity is not required for a virtuous life. While other 
virtues are necessary (but not sufficient) for magnanimity, magnanimity 
is an extraordinary virtue, exemplified only by those who are not only 
otherwise virtuous, but also possess outstanding gifts and opportunities. 
According to Aristotle pusillanimous people, who fulfill condition (ii) 
of magnanimity, but not (i), whose low self-esteem is incommensurate 
with their great worth, seem hesitant rather than foolish (as are the vain)." 
From this it may appear that Aristotle does not wish to blame them, 
either. This is not the case: their vice is actually worse than that of vanity; 
it is more opposed to magnanimity. Why is this? Because the pusillani-
mous fail to live up to their potential. It is evident that Aristotle's general 
project with respect to magnanimity is to specify the virtue by which particu-
larly gifted and good people may live up to their full potential. Pusillanimity 
directly subverts this objective, while vanity fails in a different way, 
afflicting those who do not even have the potential for greatness. Both the 
temperate and the pusillanimous are potentially magnanimous in the 
sense that they each meet one of the criteria. Pusillanimity, however, 
involves a moral failure. If one actually possesses outstanding gifts and 
opportunities, one is blameable for not exercising them in great ways: 
one's lack of self-perception is ethically defective, since magnanimity 
involves not just perceiving one's gifts but fully esteeming them, desiring 
to exemplify them in action to the fullest extent. The latter is what distin-
guishes magnanimity as a moral, rather than an intellectual virtue." 
However, we need to clarify further. First, while magnanimity is a 
second-order virtue it is incorrect to characterize it as supervening upon 
the other virtues. The exact relationship between magnanimity and the 
other virtues is left unclear by Aristotle, who simply identifies magna-
nimity as "a sort of" crown or adornment to the virtues. A superve-
nience relation, however, would entail that, necessarily, if one had great-
ness in all the virtues one would be magnanimous.55 What Aristotle 
specifies, however, is only that greatness in all the virtues is a necessary 
condition for magnanimity; he does not indicate that it is sufficient. 
Indeed, that it is not sufficient is indicated by the fact that Aristotle does 
not treat magnanimity solely as a second-order virtue, but also treats it as 
a particular virtue concerned with a specific subject matter (great things, 
honors)." Magnanimity requires more than excellence in all other 
virtues; it also requires extraordinary capacities and opportunities for, 
and the ability to handle rewards resulting from, extraordinary actions. It 
appears to be Aristotle's view that one may excel in other virtues without 
possessing extraordinary gifts and opportunities. One may be virtuous or 
morally excellent in general; but to be magnanimous one must also excel 
in the use of what is extraordinary. This sets magnanimity (with mag-
nificence) apart from Aristotle's other moral virtues, which are first-
order virtues only. Unfortunately Aristotle provides no further account 
of how these two types of virtue are related to each other. 
A second clarification: while we may think of ordinary virtue as 
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"obligatory" (i.e. necessary) for the virtuous, extraordinary virtue, how-
ever it may be construed, fits ill with the concept of supererogation. For 
while magnanimity is not expected of all good persons, it is nevertheless 
not supererogatory for those who possess the requisite gifts and oppor-
tunities; for them, it is required. 
III 
Aristotelian magnanimity faces problems not only of coherence, but 
also of content. 
1. The magnanimous person appears to have offensive attitudes toward 
others. I shall concentrate on the objection that Aristotle's magnanimous 
person is disdainful and contemptuous of other people.;7 Indeed, 
according to the account in EE, "it seems characteristic of the magnani-
mous man to be disdainful."58 He is concerned with being honored only 
by excellent people, and he despises the inferior. The difference 
between the true and the counterfeit magnanimous person is not that 
the counterfeit despises others while the magnanimous does not; both 
are disdainful, but only the truly magnanimous is justifiably so. 
On the other hand, we have seen that the estimation of persons in 
view here regards primarily their exemplification of objective worth, 
especially virtue. The magnanimous person discriminates on the basis 
of virtue-his own and others: esteeming virtue and despising vice. His 
attitude is not simply one of superiority; rather his conviction is that 
virtue should be honored as superior, wherever it is found. Insofar as 
he exemplifies virtue, he is deserving of honor, and similarly for others. 
Indeed, the mark of the counterfeit magnanimous person is that he has 
contempt for everyone else, thinking himself to be superior to all, and 
able to do whatever he pleases.59 His "superiority" is neither one of 
virtue, nor does he recognize virtue in others. He confuses the proper 
discrimination of the magnanimous with rank prejudice. 
Is the esteeming of virtue and depising of vice objectionable? Surely 
not, in principle; without some such estimate no ethical discrimination is 
possible. I suggest that what we find objectionable in Aristotle is rather 
the apparent absence of any additional, balancing notions of respect for 
the worth or dignity of a human being simply qua human being-a basic 
level of respect for all, even ethically inferior human beings-and of the 
guiding value of positive care and concern for all. Such notions have a 
different provenance, however; they arise principally from the biblical 
vision of each human being's possessing dignity as created in the image 
of God. Those of us who hold to a view of human equality thus face a 
question Aristotle didn't, as to how different levels of estimating 
worth-qua human being and qua virtuous-may relate. Indeed the 
question strikes near the heart of the distinction between an ethics of 
virtue and other ethical theories: how may the esteeming (or despising) 
of persons with regard to their excellences (which will inescapably be 
unequal) be held consistently with a conviction of their equal worth as 
human beings? 
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2. Finally, the Aristotelian magnanimous person seems to have objec-
tionable attitudes towards himself. He appears to be self-absorbed.60 
His motive for acting appears to be a desire to exemplify his great 
worth. But such manifest consciousness of his own great worth and his 
desire to exemplify it in action vitiates its very excellence. 
To evaluate this objection we should first consider Aristotle's more 
general conception of the virtuous person's motivation in choosing an 
action, and then, assuming that we consider such a picture to be accept-
able, seek to identify the further, putatively objectionable elements of the 
magnanimous person's motivation. Aristotle's view seems to be that vir-
tuous motivation enters the practical thought of the virtuous person at 
two levels. On the level of first-order practical deliberation ("What shall I 
do?"), Aristotle requires that the virtuous person choose the virtuous act 
"for itself," or "for its own sake" (di' auta).61 This requirement may seem 
priggish or overly self-conscious if it is construed as demanding that the 
virtuous (say, generous) person choose the virtuous act qua virtuous act, 
i.e. having the thought, "This is a generous act," or "I shall do this because 
it is the generous thing to do." However, it need not be so construed. 
What is required by Aristotle, rather, may be satisfied by these condi-
tions: that the generous person,S, choose the act, G, for one (or more) of 
R reasons (e.g. "He needs the money"), where R reasons express a range 
of considerations appropriate to the virtue of generosity. That 5 is gener-
ous explains why she is aware of such considerations in the situation 
(why they are salient to her), why she takes G to be appropriate, and why 
she's motivated to perform it. G, taken in this sense, is the generous 
thing to do, and 5 does G "for its own sake" -i.e. for the right reason(s), 
R (and not, e.g., under compulsion, in order to manipulate someone, but-
tress S's reputation, etc.).62 S's generosity explains why 5 recognizes G as 
appropriate and performs it; one need not require that 5 be motivated by 
consciously having a certain thought, e.g. that G is a generous act. 
There is nothing overly self-conscious about such a picture. 
However, the problem may seem to resurface in another of Aristotle's 
characterizations of the virtuous person's motives, where he insists that 
virtuous actions are done for the sake of the fine or noble (to kalon). 
"Actions expressing virtue are fine and aim at what is fine."b' Fineness 
is a property of virtuous acts which the virtuous person apparently rec-
ognizes, and this recognition seems to provide him with a distinctive, 
further reason to perform them. Need this recognition provide motiva-
tional content to the virtuous person's first-order practical deliberation 
("To stand firm here would be a fine action, so I will do it")? In EE 
Aristotle distinguishes between the fully virtuous person (kalokagathos), 
and the (merely) "good" (agathos) person. The former distinctively val-
ues virtuous actions because they are fine. As Broadie and Kenny argue, 
however, the distinction concerns, not the content of the agents' practical 
deliberation-both choose the virtuous act for its own sake-but the 
content of their second-order practical reflection, e.g. when asked about the 
point of being virtuous.h4 The fully virtuous person is reflective: he has 
thought about what he wants to be, he recognizes in his planning the 
supreme value of the virtuous life itself, and he chooses such a life on 
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that basis, while the merely good person values virtuous actions because 
"it pays" -because of the natural goods such actions make possible. 
Aristotle holds generally that desire for what is fine, and revulsion 
towards what is shameful, is distinctive of the virtuous person.65 Thus 
reflection about the fineness (or shamefulness) of goods or ends will 
provide the reflective, fully virtuous person additional reason to per-
form (or avoid) them, i.e. to be virtuous generally. Such reflection, of 
course, will influence his first-order deliberation as well: it will fine-tune 
his perception of such goods or ends as they are exemplified in practical 
situations, and thus make additional ethical considerations salient to 
him in his practical deliberation. But, again, it need not determine the 
content of such deliberation in an offensive way. 
Merely good persons, then, in Aristotle's view, may be quite unreflec-
tive about their view of virtue and its exemplification. Fully virtuous per-
sons, however, are rightly reflective. Indeed the EN itself is an example of 
reflective ethical thinking for virtuous persons concerning the nature and 
point of virtue and the good life. Note that such reflection by the virtuous 
person will not only involve his considering which goods or ends are vir-
tuous and fine, but also his having a conception of himself to which he 
aspires: the desire to exemplify virtue and fineness in action himself. A 
certain degree of self-consciousness is unavoidable if one is reflective and 
aspires to virtue-prerequisites for full virtue, on Aristotle's view. 
Assume that we accept the picture of the virtuous person's practical 
thought so far delineated. What is it that further characterizes the moti-
vation of the magnanimous person, which is supposed to render it objec-
tionable? It appears to be his self-conscious awareness of his own great 
virtue, and the motivational role of that awareness in his action. Annas 
expresses the problem: 
Aristotle has not given sufficient thought to the internal perspec-
tive involved lin the magnanimous person's practical reasoningl. 
For the megalopsuchos has to have this thought, that he merits 
greater honor and respect than others do; and this makes excep-
tional virtue into something self-centred ... But thoughts which 
centre on the self in this way are antithetical to the developent of 
virtue, not expressive of it. For virtue involves a concern to do the 
right thing because it is the right thing, and to be the kind of per-
son who does that-not to do the right thing because one is a per-
son who is outstanding at doing the right thing, and thereby wor-
thy of greater respect than others.66 
Note that the problem for Am1as is not the magnanimous person's recognition 
that the action is the right/virtuous/fine thing to do, nor even his desire to be 
the kind of person who does that (i.e. having a conception of himself to which 
he aspires, which exemplifies these desiderata in action). We may suppose 
that Annas accepts Aristotle's general picture of the motivation of the virtuous 
person in action, as we have analyzed it. What is offensive about the magnan-
imous man is rather his present self-awareness, his conception of himself-not 
of that to which he aspires, but of his own present condition. 
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Is there a genernl objection to one's being aware of the condition of 
one's character? Surely not. If it is not objectionable for a person to have 
a conception of herself to which she aspires, it cannot be objectionable for 
her to have a (truthful) conception of herself in via, to be aware of her 
own status as she progresses toward the goal, and on that basis to act. 
Indeed, progress is unintelligible apart from such a conception. The 
problem, rather, seems to be a special one for the magnanimous person-
that he (albeit accurately) recognizes his own condition to be great.67 
However, if there is no general problem with the consciousness of one's 
condition, what are the grounds for insisting upon a special problem for 
the magnanimous? 
For Annas the problem seems to be that such a perspective will 
infect the magnanimous person's practical reasoning in an objectionable 
way: if he recognizes his greatness, he will act (B) "because [he] is a per-
son who is outstanding at doing the right thing, and thereby worthy of 
greater respect than others." The import of the "because" here, howev-
er, is ambiguous. Understood one way, (Bl), "because" introduces the 
grounds of the magnanimous man's motivation. This Aristotle certainly 
affirms. It is in this sense that the magnanimous person's self-concep-
tion is paramount for Aristotle: he wants to live up to his (great) poten-
tial, and so must have a sufficient grasp and appreciation of his poten-
tial. Annas, however, appears to have another construal in mind, (B2), 
where the "because" objectionably determines the specific content of the 
magnanimous person's motivation for acting, expressed in his first-
order practical deliberation. We have seen, however, that we need not 
require (B2) of Aristotle. (Of course one's recognition of one's assets may 
translate into offensively self-conscious practical deliberation. Annas's 
objection, however, is that it will do so; for this conclusion a necessary 
connection needs to be demonstrated.) Susan's aspiration to live up to 
her extraordinary potential as a scientist makes salient for her a range of 
considerations as to what is the right thing for her to do in making a par-
ticular career choice. However, she is motivated to do what she so iden-
tifies because she sees it as the right thing for her to do. Steve aims at 
winning the gold medal in the high jump because he is a great high-
jumper, indeed far better than others. His recognition of his ability 
grounds his attempt as reasonable. The desire to be better than every-
one else, however, plays no conscious role at all in Steve's practical 
deliberation. He simply wants to be the best he can be, to reach the 
highest level of which he is able. 
It is possible, then, pace Annas, for the magnanimous person, while 
fully recognizing his assets, to aspire to great action "because it is the 
right thing, and to be the kind of person who does that." What is offen-
sive about Aristotle's picture, I now submit, is not the magnanimous 
man's consciousness of his own worth per se-which is rather an expres-
sion of the psychological stance that is necessary to his aspiring to great 
challenges. What is offensive, instead, is the absence of sufficient balanc-
ing factors of moderating humility and positive concern for others. It is 
these factors which most significantly distinguish Aquinas's account of 
magnanimity from Aristotle's. To this picture we now turn. 
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IV 
In the Summa Tlzeologiae (ST),"R Thomas Aquinas depends primarily 
upon Aristotle for his conception of magnanimity, although he also 
draws extensively from biblical, earlier Christian, and Stoic sources."9 I 
shall not attempt a complete exposition of Aquinas's extensive account; 
we are primarily interested in where Thomas diverges from or expands 
upon Aristotle. 
From the outset Aquinas situates magnanimity differently from 
Aristotle. In the ST, Aquinas discusses some sixty virtues, the rest 
falling in some way under the four cardinal or hinge virtues of justice, 
temperance, courage, and practical wisdom, or else under the theologi-
cal virtues of faith, hope, and love. The virtue of magnanimity/C] along 
with magnificence, patience, and perseverance (this structure drawn 
from Cicero)/' falls under the cardinal virtue of courage.72 Virtue makes 
its possessor good. Since a person's good is that he live rationally, 
Aquinas infers that virtue aligns a person and his actions with reason. 
This occurs in three ways: (i) one's reasoning itself is made right by 
intellectual virtues; (ii) rightness in human affairs is established by the 
moral virtue of justice; and (iii) the remaining moral virtues remove pas-
sional obstacles to the establishment of right human affairs: temperance 
removes the obstacle of one's desiring something other than what right 
reasoning identifies, while courage removes the obstacle of the will's 
being repelled by what, though right, is difficult. Magnanimity falls 
under this last category.73 
An act of courage will either be an aggressive act (attempting a diffi-
cult or dangerous deed) or an act of endurance (the continued pursuit of 
a good over time). The virtues of magnanimity and magnificence are 
related to the first kind of courageous act, patience and perseverance to 
the second. Necessary to an aggressive act is a mental readiness or 
aggressiveness, which Cicero calls "confidence" (jiducia). This Aquinas 
initially identifies with magnanimity: it disposes one to an aggressive, 
hopeful frame of mind in relation to a difficult act.'4 The most difficult 
act with which courage is specifically concerned-the defining or limit-
ing case of courage-is facing the danger of death. Magnanimity, qua 
confidence or mental aggressiveness, is an essential component of 
courage in facing such a circumstance. In the face of lesser dangers, on 
the other hand, magnanimity bears a different relation to courage: it is a 
distinct virtue, allied with courage as a secondary to a primary virtue, 
which is concerned specifically with great honors. c" What is central to 
Aquinas's account is that magnanimity shares with courage the essence 
of virtues which aim at something difficult: firmness of mind (firmitas 
animi).76 From the outset, then, Aquinas characterizes magnanimity 
essentially in terms of a mental attitude or psychological stance, aimed 
at action: magnanimity is a stretching forth of the mind to great things, 
exemplified essentially in great, difficult acts.Ci 
There are problems in associating magnanimity with courage. For 
one thing, many, perhaps most exemplifications of magnanimity do not 
involve facing dangers of death. On the other hand, the relationship 
ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS ON MAGNANIMITY 429 
Thomas describes between magnanimity and courage is illuminating.?S 
The essence of magnanimity does seem to be in the neighborhood of an 
aggressive, hopeful-frame of mind in relation to a difficult act: a stance 
of confidence toward great challenges, rooted in a strong sense of one's 
abilities and strengths. Moreover the strength of self which enables one 
to accomplish a great action in the face of immediate danger of death, 
although perhaps not a typical situation, arguably provides the clearest 
paradigm of magnanimity, the central case to which the other significa-
tions may be related analogically. 
v 
Aquinas extends the Aristotelian account helpfully, particularly 
where Aristotle's picture is incomplete or confusing. Elements we have 
seen to be implicit and embryonic in Aristotle become explicit and 
developed in Aquinas. He also draws from other sources to provide 
additional insights. I shall address Aquinas's contributions to the issues 
I have raised above with Aristotle. 
1. A putative internal tension in Aristotle concerns the role of honor and 
external goods in magnanimity. Are honors to be sought or despised? 
Is the magnanimous person's concern for honor or for virtue? For 
Aquinas as for Aristotle, magnanimity is concerned with honors, the 
greatest of external goods.'" Aquinas's account is more complex, howev-
er. A virtue is related to two things, according to Aquinas: the (subject) 
matter of its activity, and its proper act, which consists in the right use of 
its matter. Magnanimity's matter is (great) honor, and its end or proper 
act, is a great act. so Since a virtue's name is determined primarily by its 
act, the magnanimous person is so-called because he is mentally prepared 
to do some great act.S! Magnanimity is about handling great honor proper-
ly; its aim is great action, which is worthy of great honors. 
Why is honor the greatest of external goods? Earlier, in his account 
of the virtue of justice, Thomas discussed dulia, or respectful service. 
There he argued, expanding upon Aristotle again, that honoring some-
one is a testimony to his excellence. If this witness is to be borne before 
other human beings it must be done with outward signs, such as words, 
offering external goods, bowing, etc. Honor is the reward of virtue, not 
in the sense that these external things are a sufficient reward, but that 
they are rightly employed as signs pointing to eminent virtue, for it is 
right that the good and the beautiful be made evident."2 
With these distinctions Aquinas addresses the putative Aristotelian 
tension. The magnanimous person both pursues honors and despises 
them. There are two ways to despise honors (or riches): properly, one 
may despise them in the sense of never acting against virtue to attain 
them, but only utilizing them in pursuit of virtue. Improperly, however, 
one may despise honors by not aiming at doing what deserves honor. 
Hence, Thomas clarifies: "And in this way magnanimity is about honor: 
not so much that one should value the honors given by human beings, 
but that he be eager to do those things that are worthy of honor."'3 
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For Aquinas, then, the clear emphasis is internal, rather than exter-
nal; upon acting virtuously rather than upon the actual honor that 
attends it; upon being honorable rather than being honored.84 When he 
says that magnanimity is concerned with great honors, we may gloss it 
as: magnanimity is concerned with actions that are worthy of great hon-
ors. Thus Aquinas's conception follows our interpretation of Aristotle, 
but is more explicit. However, Thomas does preserve an important role 
for (received) honor: it is truly worthy of pursuit in so far as it rightly 
reflects virtue (i.e. being honorable). Indeed, under such a description 
such pursuit is obligatory. He holds to a strong objectivity of value, to 
which even the magnanimous person is beholden: true virtue is rightly 
honored, and to pursue right honor by being worthy of it is, as it were, 
honorable. Aquinas himself provides a more complete gloss on 
Aristotle: "that person seems to be magnanimous who thinks himself 
worthy of great things, i.e. that he may do great actions and that great 
things should happen to him when he is in fact worthy."85 
2. Aquinas explicitly addresses questions about the compatibility of 
magnanimity with the rest of an Aristotelian virtue picture. According 
to Aquinas, a virtue is named by its extreme, limiting case. A virtue per-
fects a power: this perfection is not obvious in every expression of the 
power, but specifically in its great or difficult acts.~6 In the case of moral 
virtues related to passions, what is difficult is reason's job of determin-
ing an appropriate balance or rational tuning of the passions, since the 
passions themselves may resist reason. Such resistance may arise either 
from the passions themselves or from the objects of the passions. Since 
it is natural for the passions to respond to rational direction, great resis-
tance to reason generally arises from the passions themselves only in the 
extreme or limiting cases, which then define their corresponding virtues. 
Thus, for example, courage is about the greatest fear and daring, and 
temperance about the greatest of desirable pleasures. 
For some passions, however, resistance to reason is tied to a specific 
kind of exterior object of the passion. Examples include the desire for 
money or honor. Maintaining rightness with regard to this kind of pas-
sion requires two virtues, each defined with respect to the object: one for 
the extreme, particularly strong case, which itself constitutes a discreet 
challenge to the agent, and one for the common case-since the external 
objects of these passions are necessary for human life they also consti-
tute in their ordinary form a perpetual challenge to reasonableness. 
Hence the desire for money requires two virtues to subject it to reason: 
magnificence for great sums, generosity for ordinary sums. Likewise 
there are two virtues about honors: the unnamed virtue concerns ordi-
nary or small honors, while magnanimity is about great honors, which 
have their own particular drawing power. Special challenges require 
special excellences. It is true that great and little are accidental to honor, 
Thomas admits, when honor is considered in itself. However when 
viewed in terms of human action, there is a special, increased difficulty 
in acting rationally concerning great honors over against small ones. 
Hence a special virtue is required.K7 
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However, Aristotelian moral virtues concern passions or actions, 
and (received) honor is neither. Indeed, Aquinas considers the objection 
that if the matter of magnanimity were honor, an external object, it fol-
lows that it would not in fact be a moral virtue.88 In his earlier discussion 
of the aggressive passions he said that the object of such passions is sen-
sible good or evil, not considered absolutely, but under the aspect of 
"difficult" or "arduous." In so far as it is seen as good, an arduous or dif-
ficult task produces in us a tendency towards it belonging to the passion 
of hope, while in so far as the task is seen to be difficult it pertains to the 
passion of despair.89 Thomas now argues that "although honor is nei-
ther a passion nor an action, it is nevertheless an object of some passion, 
namely hope, which strives toward a difficult good. Indeed magnanimi-
ty is immediately about the passion of hope, and mediately about honor, 
insofar as it is the object of hope-just as courage is about the dangers of 
death insofar as they are the object of fear and daring." That is, magna-
nimity, with regard to passion, is hope management, just as courage is fear 
management.90 By distinguishing between the passion and its object 
Aquinas works out, as Aristotle did not, a relationship between magna-
nimity and the general Aristotelian virtue picture, and expands his earli-
er insight that magnanimity is an aggressive, hopeful frame of mind in 
relation to a difficult act. 
A further Aristotelian tension concerns whether magnanimity is a 
specific, first-order virtue or a general, second-order virtue, "crowning" 
specific virtues, or both. For Aquinas, it is both. A specific virtue estab-
lishes the measure or mode of reason in a determinate matter. In the 
case of magnanimity, the matter is honors. Honor, considered in itself, 
is a particular kind of good, and so magnanimity considered in itself is a 
specific virtue. Magnanimity plays another, general role, however. 
Since it is also the reward of every virtue, its matter in this second respect 
turns out to include all the virtues-specifically all the great acts of all 
the virtues. The magnanimous person intends to do great deeds in 
every virtue inasmuch as he aims at those things which are worthy of 
great honors.91 Insofar as the acts of the other virtues are great, magna-
nimity adds its own luster or adornment to the virtues, making them 
even greater.92 Thus for Aquinas, as for Aristotle (contra, e.g., Nietzsche), 
it is not possible for one to be both wicked and magnanimous, for the 
fulfillment of the other virtues is a necessary condition for magnanimity. 
Magnanimity is a moral virtue.9' It is the disposition to take one's 
extraordinary gifts, dispositions, opportunities, or goods of fortune and 
aim them at great deeds of virtue: "if one possesses great virtue of soul, 
magnanimity makes him strive toward perfect deeds of virtue, and it 
should be said similarly concerning the use of any other good, for exam-
ple knowledge or external fortune."94 Indeed, for Aquinas these great 
deeds of virtue are not simply for one's own sake: "his entire attention is 
concerned with the goods of the community and God.""" 
In so far as magnanimity is a specific virtue, then, is it obligatory, nec-
essary to the virtuous life? Aquinas does consider failure in magnanimi-
ty to be blameworthy in certain cases, although he has a much fuller and 
more complex account of how one may fail to be magnanimous "by 
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excess" than Aristotle's simple appeal to "vanity." Aquinas's account is 
also more plausible, as certainly not all attempts at objectives beyond 
one's abilities and resources are equally problematic or vicious, or done 
from the same motivation. For Aquinas, there are three kinds of error 
here. "Ambition," for Aquinas, comprises inordinate kinds of desire for 
honor, and "vanity" comprises inordinate kinds of desire for "glory." 
These errors involve aiming at the wrong objects, or on the wrong 
grounds, or while not relating one's desires rightly to the glory of God 
or to the benefit of others.'" 
Closest to Aristotle's "vanity" is presumption, one's aiming at deeds 
out of proportion to one's abilities.97 What is wrong with this? Should 
we not rather encourage people to excel, whatever their abilities? The 
problem, for Aquinas, is that such aims fail fundamentally to preserve 
the naturally right balance between an action and a power; they are out 
of metaphysical, teleological whack. However, Aquinas's intent is clear-
ly not mediocrity or quietism: he advocates the pursuit of excellence by 
all, the straining forward of each to advance towards virtue.98 Nor does 
he consider just any attempt which exceeds one's powers to be pre-
sumptuous. The kind of acts he has in mind throughout are extraordi-
nary deeds, which require extraordinary resources for success.99 To enter 
Olympic gold medal competition when one is entirely unprepared or 
unsuited is blameworthily foolish. Similarly, to accept a high visibility 
vocational challenge requiring exceptional ability when one's gifts are 
insufficient is not only foolish but shameful, and will likely result in a 
waste of time and resources for many. 
Pusillanimity is opposed (by deficiency) to the natural inclination to 
accomplish an action commensurate with one's capacities. lOll Aquinas 
distinguishes the species of pusillanimity-smallness of soul-from its 
cause and effect. The cause is both intellectual and appetitive: from the 
point of view of the intellect, pusillanimity involves a rational mistake, 
an ignorance of one's own condition. With regard to desire, it is a fear of 
failing to accomplish an action, which one falsely thinks exceeds one's 
capacity. The effect is to shrink from the great things of which one is 
worthy.1Ul While magnanimity includes accurate self-knowledge, it is a 
self-knowledge with moral content. It involves not only discerning 
one's capacities, but desiring to act in a manner fully worthy of them. 
Hence, ignorance of the pusillanimous kind does not arise from mere 
foolishness, but more from sluggishness, indolence, disinclination, or 
even improper pride102 in the examining of one's capacities or in carrying 
out what is under one's power. Magnanimity is desiderative, a moral 
virtue: "as it pertains to magnanimity, hope for anything presupposes 
one's appetite stretched forth to great things by desire."lOl 
Magnanimity, then, is "obligatory" for those so gifted, but not 
required of those who are not. Unlike Aristotle, Aquinas does not place 
magnanimity on even an apparent par of scope with temperance, justice, 
and courage: it is not a cardinal virtue, which has universal application; 
it is a subordinate virtue which has only special application, to those 
who have particular callings. As does Aristotle, Aquinas appeals as well 
to a related ordinary virtue, the unnamed virtue, which does seem to 
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have more general application: whatever one's gifts, exemplifying this 
virtue would be expected of one, in order for one to be virtuous. In 
addition to this general virtue, a special virtue is required of those with 
great gifts, in view of the special challenge presented by extraordinary 
challenges and honors. 
Aquinas, filling out Aristotle's account, manages to preserve both 
the minimal requirements of ordinary virtue and the maximal require-
ments of extraordinary virtue. The maximal is rooted in the minimal; in 
going beyond it does not replace, subvert, or compete with it. As with 
Aristotle, moreover, to consider magnanimity "supererogatory" is not 
apt. For the less gifted, to attempt the great deeds of the magnanimous, 
would not be supererogatory-but-not-required: it would actually consti-
tute a failure of virtue: presumption. What is required of each is rather to 
aim at fulfilling his rightly-discerned potential. To the less gifted, mag-
nanimity simply does not apply; to the extraordinarily gifted, magna-
nimity is required. 10' A more apt concept than supererogation to serve 
as a supplement to that of the requirements of ordinary virtue, to which 
Aquinas could have (but didn't) profitably appeal here, is a theological 
one: the notion of one's cailing, which is individualized according to 
one's gifts, inclinations, and opportunities. From one to whom much is 
given, much is required. JOs 
Vi 
1. Aristotle characterizes the magnanimous person as exhibiting atti-
tudes to others which seem reprehensible, such as disdain and contempt 
for others of lesser worth. Not surprisingly, Aquinas's Christian account 
differs significantly from Aristotle's in this respect. How it differs, how-
ever, is not so much due to a different notion of magnanimity as it is to 
the addition of Christian theoretical background commitments and val-
ues which underwrite the need for a theologically grounded humility 
and a general respect for human beings as made in the image of God. 
These in turn give Aquinian magnanimity a distinctive shape. Where 
Aquinas actually specifies the great acts which particularly characterize 
the magnanimous person, for example, they look surprisingly like "lov-
ing one's neighbor."1l16 "Since the magnanimous person alms at great 
things, it follows that he aims especially at those which convey a certain 
excellence, and scorns those which tend toward defect. Now it belongs 
to such excellence to be beneficent, generous, and grateful."107 Great 
acts, for Aquinas, are particularly characterized by care for others. Such 
a conception opens up the field of magnanimity, for Thomas, beyond 
what is explicit in Aristotle (at least in the Ethics), where great acts take 
on a predominately military cast. On Aquinas's conception paradigms 
of extraordinary virtue could more obviously include individuals like 
Mother Teresa or doctors who choose to work in poor inner cities. 
More generally, Aquinas's portrayal of the magnanimous person's 
treatment of others is two-tiered. First, as with Aristotle, the magnanimous 
person evaluates others in accord with their excellence. He exercises dis-
crimination as to their exemplification of virtue, honoring virtue and despis-
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ing vice. Such powers of discrimination are praiseworthy, for Aquinas; 
they are part of prudentia, morally sensitive practical wisdom. On his objec-
tivist view of worth, it is proper to individuals to recognize and value 
worth, whether in others or in oneself, and to disdain the lack of such. 
At the same time Aquinas, going beyond Aristotle, interprets the 
Aristotelian magnanimous man as according even the less worthy per-
son proper respect: "For the magnanimous person is not said to be con-
temptuous in the sense that he despises others-as it were depriving 
them of due respect-but because he does not value them more than he 
should."108 Thomas views personal worth on two levels: a floor of gener-
al, due respect for all, as well as differential structures of special respect 
or valuing of true worth, wherever it is exemplified. Not only are there 
honors which are reserved only for the worthy few, but there are also 
constraints in the other direction, concerning how one may treat any per-
son, no matter how ignoble or unworthy. '<19 
Aquinas makes two additional moves beyond Aristotle, which gov-
ern the magnanimous person's esteeming of his own and others' partic-
ular excellences. First, he relativizes human worth by placing one's 
worth-one's gifts, dispositions, opportunities, and goods-within the 
framework of stewardship. According to Thomas, what is great in a 
person he has as a gift from God. 110 The view of one's gifts as gifts 
excludes improper pride, in the sense of one's holding one's own value 
as supreme or entirely self-produced, or as distinguishing oneself in the 
most fundamental axiological way from other, differently gifted individ-
uals. It does not exclude a high esteem of one's gifts, however. In fact, it 
provides an additional reason for such esteem: gratitude.'" 
Second, and on this basis, Thomas introduces another virtue which, in 
a different discussion,112 he strikingly describes as a twin virtue (duplex vir-
tus) to magnanimity: humility. These twin virtues keep one within a ratio-
nal balance with regard to great, difficult honors, and also with regard to 
treating people in terms of their worth. Magnanimity disposes one to 
think well enough of oneself to live up to one's potential. Humility, a part 
of temperance,1I3 helps one recognize one's deficiencies. Magnanimity 
also disposes one to despise others insofar as they abandon God's gifts. 
To despise them, however, means: to esteem their opinions, values, and 
behavior-not their persons-less than one esteems God's gifts, which are 
of true worth; and thus not to do anything disgraceful for the sake of 
impressing them or out of fear of offending them. Humility, on the other 
hand, honors others and esteems them as superior inasmuch as something 
of God's gifts are seen in them. Humility opens one's eyes to see and 
appreciate the gifts of others, just as magnanimity does for one's own. In 
both cases it is the objective value of God's gifts that is emphasized, and 
so improper pride is excluded. Magnanimity and humility are not con-
trary, says Aquinas, although they seem to head in different directions, 
since they proceed according to different considerations. 11• Indeed, 
according to Thomas, both are necessary to virtue: together they dispose 
one to exercise both the proper esteem and contempt called for in relating 
to excellence in oneself and others.115 
In relativizing one's worth in terms of gift and stewardship, which 
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results in humility, and in affirming the general respect required for others, 
Aquinas's Christian presuppositions most significantly alter his broadly 
Aristotelian conception of magnanimity. His view is suggestive for all who 
both are attracted to an ethics of virtue and subscribe to the equality of 
human worth. A notion of basic human dignity may be compatible with an 
appreciation of particular excellences and an admiration of superior ones, 
when the levels of a minimum of universal respect and a maximum of par-
ticular admiration are kept distinct, and when proper esteem and contempt 
are aimed rather at ideas and behaviors than at the basic dignity of persons. 
Moreover the addition of humility, understood as a complement to magna-
nimity, provides needed balance to the Aristotelian picture. One who only 
grasps one's own strengths, without fully appreciating the strengths of oth-
ers and acknowledging them when appropriate, is not ethically superior, 
however rightly self-confident one may be. Humility is an essential aspect of 
handling honors properly. 
2. Finally, we face the problem of the magnanimous person's apparent 
self-absorption. Aquinas's account shifts Aristotle's emphasis from the 
magnanimous man's consciousness of his own great worth to the great 
actions for which the magnanimous person strives. Although sufficient 
gifts are clearly required by Aquinas for magnanimity, the magnani-
mous person on Aquinas's conception is not so baldly self-conscious as 
he appears in Aristotle. Indeed Aquinas's most explicit account of the 
magnanimous person's recognition of the greatness of his own strengths 
actually appears in the context of Aquinas's discussion of humility, 
where he describes them as gifts of God.116 
I argued above that the magnanimous person's awareness of his 
strengths need not be offensive, per se, although in Aristotle's explicit 
picture this awareness is insufficiently balanced by moderating humility 
and positive concern for the welfare of others. Aquinas's account pro-
vides these balancing considerations. With these considerations in 
mind, we may accept the central insight of Aristotle's and Aquinas's 
accounts of magnanimity, which is that a proper recognizing and 
esteeming of one's gifts seems not only unobjectionable but necessary for 
one's reasonably attempting difficult challenges. Magnanimity-indeed 
its name as "great-souled"-constitutes at its core the notion of one's 
having sufficient psychic strength to aim at a great but difficult action. 
Unless one has the confidence that one can do it, that one has the gifts 
and abilities to meet the task, one will not reasonably attempt it. Such 
confidence requires an awareness of one's gifts and abilities, a concep-
tion of oneself as being capable of the task, and a desire to express that 
conception in action. 
Is a clear awareness and appreciation of one's gifts and abilities 
compatible with Christian virtue? We may reasonably complain that 
Aquinas does not go far enough in relativizing one's view of one's 
worth: he does not emphasize in this context, as does the New 
Testament generally, the grace of God in forgiving and blessing decided-
ly unvirtuous human beings. Still, having an accurate appraisal of one's 
gifts as gifts is commended by no less than st. Paul: "For by the grace 
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given me I say to everyone of you: Do not think of yourselves more 
highly than you ought, but rather think of yourselves with sober judg-
ment,117 in accordance with the measure of faith God has given you ... 
We have different gifts, according to the grace given us ... [each should 
use his gift1 in proportion to his faith" (Romans 12.3, 6).lIk 
Aquinas is, if anything, less reluctant than Aristotle to attribute to 
the magnanimous person the desire to exemplify great excellence in his 
actions. "Thus the magnanimous person intends to do great deeds in 
every virtue; that is, in so far as he aims at those things which are wor-
thy of great honors." 1 19 Moreover, he avoids defective, vicious acts (such 
as untruthfulness or complaining) under a special conception (speciaiem 
rationem), as being contrary to excellence or greatness. '20 The virtue of 
magnanimity, then, gives its possessor a further reason to act (avoid act-
ing) in a given situation, beyond his recognition that such an act is virtu-
ous (vicious): viz. that it is (not) great. Indeed, an act, say of courage, so 
performed, now belongs to a further species of act-magnanimity-fol-
lowing, Aquinas notes, a different motive. 121 
This can largely be understood along the lines we traced with Aristotle. 
The magnanimous person's awareness of his own strengths and his con~ '-
eration and valuing of acts that are great may play their primary role in 'i 
second-order reflection concerning the kind of life that is worth living, 
rather than in his first-order deliberations about what to do. His grasp of 
what is great, and his motivation to perform it, are explained by his being 
magnanimous, but his choice of the great act may be simply "for its own 
sake"; he need not have the thought that it is an extraordinarily great act. 
Still it is natural to read both Aristotle and Aquinas as assuming that 
a magnanimous person would in at least some cases have such a thought, 
i.e. would construe the practical situation facing him in a way that 
expresses a more conscious awareness of his abilities and the greatness 
of the act he is considering. Even this, however, is not necessarily prob-
lematic. An extraordinarily gifted individual so situated may well rec-
ognize the appropriateness of certain actions in so far as they express or 
exemplify the greatness to which she consciously aspires; she may see 
an action as: the kind of act I am able to do, the kind I aspire to do 
because of who I am and the gifts I possess, and the kind of act I should 
be ashamed not to do (and in this sense "must" do)-although it is not 
required of me by others, nor would I blame anyone else for not doing 
it. A person so gifted and situated would thus see contrary acts as 
"beneath" her, as not exemplifying in action what she takes herself to be 
and aspires to be-although they are not vicious acts, or ones that she 
would blame someone else for doing.122 There need be nothing offensive 
about this picture. 
VII 
By way of summarizing the picture of magnanimity that has devel-
oped here, consider a contemporary paradigm of a remarkable, extraor-
dinary individual: an educational administrator who takes on the chal-
lenge of becoming the principal of a depressed, dangerous inner city 
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school, with the aspiration of making it one of the nation's outstanding 
schools. Individuals have accomplished similar aims with remarkable 
success in recent years. What does such a person require? She needs 
exceptional gifts of leadership, political and economic savvy, relational 
skills, and experience. Moreover, she needs to know that she has those 
strengths, and that she can use them effectively. Further, however, she 
needs an aggressive, hopeful frame of mind in relation to a difficult act, a confi-
dent stance towards her challenge, which will impel her towards it. 
These are the components of magnanimity: for the exceptionally gifted, 
a clear understanding of her strengths and a sufficiently confident 
appreciation of them which will enable her to act in aggressive hope of 
success. The virtue of humility enables her to see her weaknesses as 
well, so as to temper her confidence with realism and to see and value 
the strengths of others, enabling her to work with them more effectively. 
Why does such a magnanimous person take on the challenge? 
Because it "needs" to be done? Certainly it does, but many things need to 
be done. Why this one? Because one of her beliefs is that there ought to 
be more good schools? Again, there are manifold ways to contribute to 
good schools. Here, it seems to me, when we seek to explain the magnan-
imous person's actions, appealing in some way to her self-consciousness 
is plausible, if not unavoidable. She takes on the challenge because it's an 
eminently worthy task, a fine action which she is uniquely qualified to do, and 
which expresses the kind of excellence which she knows she is capable of and 
aspires to exemplify to the highest degree. It's a gold medal-type challenge, 
whether she is in fact so honored or not. Beyond the other virtues it 
expresses, it is a great act, and this provides an additional reason for her to 
do it, since she sees herself as capable of and aspiring to such greatness. 
Her strengths and the act's greatness uniquely converge, such that were 
she not to do the act, she would be ashamed of herself; she would have 
failed to aspire to her potential. She would have missed her "calling." 
I suggest that this picture plausibly represents how extraordinary 
excellence is in fact expressed in terms of practical reasoning. Is it offen-
sive from a Christian perspective? It need not be, particularly if Thomas's 
additional insights are appropriated. Such a person, following Aquinas, 
need not be arrogant; she may esteem her gifts highly as gifts from God, 
and her humility may dispose her fully to value others' gifts as well. She 
need not be priggish or self-absorbed; indeed her strong sense of self may 
liberate her, as Thomas suggests, to give her whole attention to the good 
of others,123 rather than constantly seeking their affirmation.124 
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